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DISCRETION IN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION
Nathalie des Rosiers and Bruce Feldthusen*
RtSUMk
Les auteurs examinent les diverses formes de pouvoir discrdtionnaire qui
apparaissent au sein de l'administration de la l6gislation sociale. Leur con-
clusion est qu'il n'est pas vraiment important de savoir s'il y a de nombreuses
r~gles pr6cises ou si on peut ou non avoir un pouvoir discr~tionnaire au
niveau administratif. En effet, la distinction conceptuelle entre r~gles et
pouvoir discr~tionnaire s'av~re inexistante dans la pratique, et les travailleurs
ont tendance A suivre un code d6ontologique defait plut6t que de droit. Selon
les auteurs, il serait plus important d'am6liorer les m6thodes de recrutement
et de formation que de s'attarder sur la precision des r~gles. Dins l'ensemble,
les auteurs pr6f~rent des r~gles moins nombreuses et simples A appliquer A
des r~gles complexes visant A couvrir chaque situation.
The authors survey the kinds of discretion found in the administration of
social legislation. They conclude that whether there are many precise rules
or whether administrative discretion is allowed is much less important than
is usually supposed. This is because the conceptual distinction between rules
and discretion breaks down in practice, and because of a tendency for workers
to follow a de facto code of discretionary conduct. The authors observe that
recruitment and training practices may be more important to achieving the
purposes of the legislation than whether there are precise rules or not. In
general the authors favour fewer rules that are relatively simple in their
application over complex rules intended to cover every situation.
1. INTRODUCTION
What tells in holdin' your grip on your district is to go right down among the
poor families and help them in the different ways they need help. I've got a
regular system for this. If there's a fire in Ninth, Tenth, or Eleventh Avenue,
... any hours of the day or night, I'm usually there with some of my election
district captains as soon as the fire engines. If a family is burned out, ... I
don't refer them to the Charity Organization Society, which would investi-
gate their case in a month or two and decide they were worthy of help about
* Copyright © 1992 Nathalie des Rosiers and Bruce Feldthusen. They are professors of
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the time they are dead from starvation. I just get quarters for them, buy
clothes for them ... fix them up 'til they get things runnin' again. 1
For a family caught in a bum-out, the Fire Department's battalion chief at
the scene issues a written "notification of possible need for temporary or per-
manent shelter for persons due to fire" for the occupants ... and calls his dis-
patcher who in turn informs the central Emergency Desk at the Department
of Relocation, which reports the case to their [sic] personnel in the nearest
hotel or shelter that the agency uses for such cases-if the fire is between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday. If not, the fire dispatcher notified
the Red Cross, which places the family overnight and refers the case to relo-
cation officials in the morning-assuming the family is living in a private
dwelling. If the house or apartment is owned by a public agency like the
New York City Housing Authority, the Department of Real Estate, or Urban
Renewal, the Department of Relocation has no jurisdiction. In these cases,
the Department of Social Services is responsible, if the family is already on
public assistance or qualifies for special emergency aid. After the family is
housed, it must make an appointment at the nearest Income Maintenance
(Welfare) Centre for an interview to apply for a "disaster relief grant" cover-
ing clothes, food, and lost furniture; arrange for children to go to schools in a
new area, since the shelters are usually not in the same community; and
begin to look for an apartment with the assistance of housing staff in the
Departments of Relocation or Social Services.2
The objective of this paper is to study the exercise of discretion in social
assistance legislation, and to bring this research to bear on options for reform.
This paper will provide a theoretical discussion of discretion in social
assistance legislation. In a future paper, we intend to apply the theoretical
conclusions to the present social assistance legislation and make concrete
recommendations for change.
Beatty offers the following working definition of discretion: 3
... an official making a decision has discretion in a given situation if the
rules governing his or her decision allow for the exercise of interpretation or
judgment. ... A decision-maker lacks discretion in a situation if there are pre-
cise rules which determine exactly what is to be done.
1. George W. Plunkitt, famous political boss in New York City in the early 1900's
quoted by Norton, "Public Assistance, Post-New Deal Bureaucracy, and the Law:
Learning from Negative Models" (1983) 92 Yale L.J 1287 at 1291-2.
2. Standard Operating Procedures of the New York Fire Department during the 1970s.,
quoted by Norton, ibid.
3. H. Beatty, "Discretionary Decision-Making, Equity, and Social Assistance", at 4
(Report prepared for the Social Assistance Review Committee, 1987). The authors
wish to extend their appreciation for having been able to rely on this most helpful
work.
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It is useful to think in terms of a continuum between discretion and rule
precision, and to think of more or less discretion, more or less precision. In
practical terms the goal is to attempt to strike the correct balance between
discretion and rule precision. A gain in one direction, flexibility for example,
will occur at an expense in another direction, consistency perhaps. The choice
of the "appropriate" level of discretion will often depend on conflicting value
choices. We try in this paper to present value choices for consideration and
to make our own value choices explicit.
K.C. Davis has provided a slightly different definition of discretion from that
given by Beatty. Davis defined discretion as a situation in which "the
effective limits on (an official's) power leave him (sic) free to make a choice
among possible courses of action or inaction.". 4 This is a pragmatic definition
which differs from Beatty's primarily in that it includes unauthorized as well
as authorized exercises of discretion. We believe that an understanding of the
significance of unlawful, de facto discretion is necessary in order to appre-
ciate fully what can and can not be accomplished by controlling discretion
granted by legislation. Thus, we will include some consideration of enforce-
ment in our analysis of discretion, even though this might be omitted in
traditional legal analysis.
Similarly, although our main concern is with relatively high level discretion-
ary power, usually statutory powers of decision5, we shall have to keep in
mind the significance of lower level discretion. Aclient's success at obtaining
assistance may turn as much on what information a worker volunteers, on a
worker's willingness to schedule an appointment at the client's convenience,
or on a worker's attitude towards the client, as on any legislative grant of
formal discretion.
Finally, our study focuses directly on discretionary powers that affect clients;
for example, discretion regarding eligibility or quantum of assistance. We
exclude from consideration discretionary powers that affect, for example,
relations between workers and supervisors, or relations among workers
themselves.
4. K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1969) at 4.
5. "... a power or right conferred by or under a statute to make a decision deciding or
prescribing, (i) the legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities of
any person or party, or (ii) the eligibility ... to receive (or continue to receive) a ben-
efit ... whether he is legally entitled thereto or not." Judicial Review Procedure Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 224, s. 1(f).
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Our research has brought us to consider the developments in the disciplines
of political science and sociology. These students of public organizational
behaviour focus on how an organization actually operates as opposed to the
lawyers' preoccupation with how an organization ought to operate according
to formal institutional design. One of the important findings of the social
scientists is that the formal legal structures of organizations tend to tell us
relatively little about how the organization actually functions.
Our initial premise was that it might matter significantly whether to employ
discretionary powers or precise rules in social assistance legislation. We are
somewhat embarrassed to report that, based on the theoretical investigation,
we have concluded that it matters a great deal less than we originally had
supposed, and a great deal less than other issues. It is for this reason that our
analysis has drifted on occasion into related areas, particularly the monitoring
and enforcement of de facto discretion.
Section 2, immediately below, is a stage-setting section in which we intro-
duce the main questions and concerns posed by administrative discretion.
There is a typical pattern to the legal analysis of administrative discretion. It
begins with a critique of administrative discretion. From that beginning,
discretion remains on the defensive throughout. This is true regardless of
whether the analysis proceeds to the conclusion that some discretion is
potentially useful, or to the conclusion that discretion is a necessary evil that
ought to be controlled whenever possible. Suspicion of administrative dis-
cretion survives all analysis. There seems to exist a considerable gap between
acquittal on all charges and outright vindication.
Inevitably, much of our analysis falls into this pattern. However, we have
tried to break from that tradition by beginning our stage-setting on a more
positive note. We emphasize that discretion is human judgment, part of our
humanity, and as such valued despite its human shortcomings. By this, we
try to emphasize that our task ought to be to control the inappropriate exercise
of discretion; not to control or eliminate discretion itself.
We then describe the two related, but different types of criticisms commonly
levelled against discretion; the symbolic and the practical. By the symbolic,
we mean the conflict between the rule of law ideology and the patently human
discretionary powers. The practical indictment of discretion as "arbitrary" is
then explored in its various meanings: capricious, inappropriate or personal,
and despotic.
In the remainder of the paper, we attempt to focus on the characteristics of
administrative discretion in a more neutral manner. We develop three inter-
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related themes. The first is that discretion is inevitable. Every rule requires
discretion in application. The more rules we promulgate, the less likely they
will be followed. Instead, workers will follow a defacto code of discretionary
conduct. The second theme is that the analytic distinction between rules and
discretion tends to collapse in practice. Just as rules admit of much discretion
in application, so discretionary powers are subject to firm constraints, legal
and practical. The third is that it is de facto discretion that governs bureau-
cratic conduct and de facto discretion that is experienced by clients, as much
or more than conduct authorized by legal rules or powers. We conclude with
some general observations that will be the basis of our second more practical
paper. Our conclusions are not so much critical or supportive of statutory
powers of discretion in social assistance legislation. Rather, we conclude that
the difference between precise rules and discretionary powers in social
assistance legislation is less than is usually supposed. We do recommend
more structured discretionary powers, but for somewhat different reasons and
with more modest expectations than is typically the case.
2. SETTING THE STAGE: THE PROS AND CONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
2.1 A WORD IN FAVOUR OF HUMAN JUDGMENT
Administrative discretion is not a positive symbol in public institutional
design.6 The word is associated with capricious, despotic and biased deci-
sion-making. Lawyers in particular have never been comfortable with dis-
cretion within a legal framework. Persons who have anything good to say
about discretion tend to be dismissed for favouring a romanticized (and
classist) vision of the good old days when caring professionals controlled the
entire social assistance process in the interests of dependent clients.
The exercise of human discretion in a particular case has no inherent value.
Discretion is a virtue when exercised in an "appropriate" manner. Otherwise
it is a vice. To the extent that we can judge the exercise of discretion as
appropriate or not, we can only do so after the fact. Were it otherwise, we
would have attempted to determine the outcome by rule.
The concept of discretion does have inherent value. To exercise discretion is
to exercise human judgment. This is one aspect of our humanity. Another is
to be affected by the human judgment of others. If we could predict in advance
6. See Beatty, supra, note 3 at 3.
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how discretion ought to be exercised in a particular case, we would not have
needed discretion in the first place. One of the main reasons why we can not
predict outcomes in advance is because we can not replicate by rule the
number and weight of relevant factors that comprise human judgment.
Administrative discretion is the implicit endorsement of human judgment.
Consider the alternative. We could devise a social assistance scheme under
which all important determinations were made by rule. Indeed, we could
devise such precise rules that, once data were checked for accuracy, decisions
could be made by computers.7 But, for most of us this would be an Orwellian
nightmare, not an ideal to which to aspire. We would have lost the human
ability to recognize unique situations, unanticipated factors, or unusual
weights and different combinations of standard factors. We would literally
have dehumanized the entire process for clients and workers alike.
This is not to wax eloquently or naively about human judgment. Once we
attach value to human judgment in any decision-making process, we must
accept that there will be human failure along with success; bias with fairness;
arrogance with compassion; ignorance with appreciation. 8 The real task is to
attempt to control the inappropriate exercise of discretion. The key may lie
beyond the scope of this paper; in recruitment, education, training, monitor-
ing and enforcing. Limiting and structuring discretion with more precise rules
and standards may also have a role to play. But it is important to keep in mind
that every movement along the continuum towards precision is a move away
from human judgment. This is a choice that should be made deliberately and
reflectively, not one to be based on a rote bias against unstructured discretion.
2.2 THE SYMBOLIC OBJECTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION
Ours is a society raised on the "rule of law" ideology. We use the term
ideology deliberately to emphasize that the reified conception of law that
permeates our civic culture simply does not exist. In reality, laws, however
precise, are enforced, applied and interpreted by human beings exercising
7. For example, the calculation of the shelter allowance under Regulations 12(2)4,
9,and 11 of the General WelfareAssistanceAct.
8. "... discretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice,
either reasonableness or unreasonableness." Anizrnan, ed., preface to "A Catalogue
of Discretionary Powers in the Revised Statutes of Canada 1970" (Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1975).
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formal and defacto discretion. Collectively, we find it comforting to believe
otherwise, and to minimize the human element of legal decision-making. 9
Although administrative discretion-making is remarkably similar to legal
decision-making, it simply does not fit into this rule of law model. Public
administration has none of the mystery of law; administrative decisions are
made without the ritual of law; and administrators function without the
professional status of lawyers and judges. Administrative discretion is naked
human decision-making. Without the ideological support that nurtures law-
yers and judges, administrative discretion is vulnerable to the type of criti-
cism from which our legal system is culturally protected.
The symbolic objection to administrative discretion is especially forceful in
the context of social assistance. Much depends on how social assistance is
conceptualized and legitimized in a particular jurisdiction. For example, it is
possible to regard social assistance as a matter of public largesse, a matter of
public charity, a privilege. By definition, social assistance would be discre-
tionary under this model. It would be entirely consistent with this model to
implement the legislative scheme without affording to applicants any legal
rights whatsoever. Matters of initial eligibility, quantum of support, variation
and termination, and procedural protection could all coherently be governed
by strong discretionary language.
In contrast, there is an entirely different conception under which the govern-
ment is obliged to meet the basic human needs of all its citizens and those
citizens are entitled to demand that it do so. We shall call this a citizen
entitlement model. We believe that the citizen entitlement model is much
closer to the philosophy of the government of Ontario, and that of the majority
of its citizens, than the pure largesse model. 10 Here, by definition, social
9. It is impossible to do justice to the complexity or importance of this line of argu-
ment in a few lines. For a powerful discussion, see T.W. Arnold, Symbols of Gov-
ernment (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962).
10. See for example, Transitions (Toronto: Publications Ontario, 1988), Report of the
Social Assistance Review Committee, at 9 and 11-2. We must, however, acknowl-
edge that the Canadian courts have not always taken this view, a point to be kept in
mind when looking to the courts for general client protection in this field. See Has-
son, "What's Your Favourite Right? The Charter And Income Maintenance Legisla-
tion" (1989) 5 J. Law & Soc. Pol. 1; and Morrison, "Poverty Law And The Charter:
The Year In Review" (1990) 6 J. Law & Soc. Pol. 1. See also Rochman, "Working
For Welfare: A response To The Social Assistance Review Committee" (1989) 5 J.
Law & Soc. Pol. 199, suggesting that the public may not be strongly in the citizen
entitlement camp either. Of course, persons who reject the entitlement model are not
the ones who are criticizing the discretionary aspects as arbitrary.
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assistance is a matter of rights and obligations. In that context, discretionary
power seems incoherent and offensive. How can one speak meaningfully of
obligation and entitlement, if the obligation and entitlement are defined and
effected by discretionary decisions, rather than through precise legal defini-
tion? In our opinion, this apparent incoherence is one of the main sources of
objection to discretionary power in social assistance legislation.
Objections of this nature came to the fore in the United States in the 1960's.
Much can be learned from the experience there. The 1960's in the United
States can be characterized as decade dominated by liberal legal reform. This
is so in two senses. First, there was an increased mainstream interest in issues
affecting the relatively less powerful segments of the population. Second,
there was a general belief that these issues could be best advanced by law,
and in particular by legal rights. Social assistance was an especially attractive
target for liberal legal reform. It concerned, in particular, the poor and
members of minority groups. And, the legislation typically treated eligibility
for benefits as a discretionary matter rather than as a matter of rights-based
legal entitlement. Prior to 1960, social assistance had been conceptualized in
the culture and in the legislation in a manner consistent with the government
largesse model. 11
The classic attack on government discretion generally was the now famous
"New Property" article written by a Yale law professor, Charles Reich. It
contained many references to discretion in the social assistance field. Reich
emphasized the tremendous power over claimants which administrative
discretion conferred to bureaucrats, and he lamented the virtual absence of
legal protection for recipients or legal control over service providers. He
concluded: 12
The concept of right is most urgently needed with respect to benefits like
unemployment compensation, public assistance, and old age insurance....
The aim of these benefits is to preserve the self-sufficiency of the individual,
to rehabilitate him where necessary, and to allow him to be a valuable mem-
ber of a family and a community; in theory they represent part of the
individual's rightful share in the commonwealth. Only by making such bene-
fits into rights can the welfare state achieve its goal of providing a secure
minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity in a society where each
man cannot be wholly the master of his own destiny.
11. For a richer and more accurate history relevant to the present debate, see Simon,
"The Invention And Reinvention Of Welfare Rights" (1985) 44 Maryland L.R. 1.
12. C. Reich, "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LJ. 733 at 785-6.
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Although Reich's descriptions of the evils of discretion remain relevant
today, even inspiring to those who share his liberal values, further study has
revealed far more complications than he might have imagined. In particular,
although the citizen entitlement model has probably become more widely and
strongly accepted throughout the western world, American scholars have
discovered that it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to achieve it
solely or mainly through legal rights and precise legal rules. In other words,
just as they discovered the shortcomings of discretion, they next discovered
the shortcoming of legal rules. Indeed, they have had to face up to the
shortcomings of law itself as an effective vehicle for controlling the bureau-
cracy.
We will demonstrate below that discretionary powers are inevitable in any
bureaucratic regime, including the social assistance scheme. We will argue
that the practical differences between discretion and rules are far less than
they appear to be. To the extent that they are different, we will suggest a
mixture of rules and discretion is as desirable as it is necessary. However,
rational analysis is no antidote for symbolic complaints. The government
must accept that while efficient administration requires discretion, such
discretion will always be a source of citizen complaint.
2.3 DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING CRITICIZED
AS ARBITRARY DECISION-MAKING: CAPRICIOUS,
PERSONAL, OR DESPOTIC?
Of course, objections to discretionary power in social assistance legislation
have a practical basis as well as a symbolic one. The practical objection, and
perhaps the one voiced most frequently, is that discretionary decisions are
"arbitrary" decisions. This is a complex objection, a complexity revealed by
the different shades of meaning of the word "arbitrary" in the English
language.
To complain about arbitrary decisions may be to complain about decisions
that appear to be made at random, capriciously or by whim. We shall attempt
to demonstrate below that this objection is misconceived. In law there is no
such thing as a statutory power of decision that authorizes random, capri-
cious, or whimsical decision making. Legislation that says that an officer
"may" grant a certain benefit does not mean at law that the officer may grant
or withhold benefits for any reason whatsoever. Through their power of
judicial review, the courts limit discretionary powers to purposes consistent
with the legislation that grants the power. This is developed further in Section
4...
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A different, but equally important objection is that many bureaucratic deci-
sions appear capricious to clients. To a limited degree, this can be addressed
by having the government, or the agency under its rule-making power, limit
discretionary powers explicitly or at least declare the governing purpose
behind discretionary powers. Beyond that, social scientists have demon-
strated that decision makers seldom act in a capricious manner. Rather, they
act according to a de facto set of rules that may or may not accord with the
statutory purpose behind the discretionary power.
This takes us to another possible meaning behind the objection to arbitrary
decision making. To criticize a decision as "arbitrary" may be to criticize it
as wrong, inappropriate, and usually as one made for personal reasons. This
observation is confirmed by social science research. There is every reason to
expect decision-makers to act according to a set of rules divorced from the
statutory purpose, perhaps according to some organizational norms and
perhaps according to personal biases and interests. This will occur, not only
in isolated cases but also systemically throughout any large bureaucratic
organization.
However, replacing statute authorized discretionary powers with more pre-
cise rules is not necessarily, or even usually, likely to correct this. Instead,
we must face the problem of how to monitor and enforce compliance with
legislative goals in a public bureaucracy. Although this is a separate topic,
we shall have to give it some attention below.
Much the same is true about another possible meaning to the complaint about
arbitrary decision-making. The term "arbitrary" may be used to describe a
manner of decision-making, imperious, autocratic or despotic, rather than an
outcome of the process. The manner in which clients are treated is every bit
as legitimate a concern as the outcomes of the process. In fact, treating clients
with dignity and respect is as much an exercise in social responsibility as is
assisting them with financial needs. However, whatever tendency to imper-
ious worker behaviour may exist, it does not derive from formal grant of
discretionary power and it can not be controlled by shifting to more precise
rules. Simon makes the following observation: 13
When lawyers confronted the welfare system in the 1960's, they charged it
with oppressive moralism, personal manipulation, and invasion of privacy.
They focused attention on the "man-in-the-house" rules that disqualified
families on the basis of the mother's sexual conduct and the "midnight raids"
13. Simon, "Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System" (1983) 92 Yale
LJ. 1198.
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in which welfare workers forced they way into recipients' homes searching
for evidence of cohabitation.
When I represented welfare recipients from 1979 to 1981, the workers
showed little interest in policing their morals or intruding on their private
lives. The "man-in-the-house" rule and the practice of unannounced or
nighttime visits had been repudiated. Yet the pathologies emphasized by the
lawyers of the 1960's seemed to have been mitigated at the costs of exacer-
bating others that were in some respects their mirror images: indifference,
impersonality, and irresponsibility. The new pathologies were typified by
cases in which newly arrived Cuban refugees were denied assistance because
they could not produce appropriately certified copies of birth certificates for
their children or in which people who sought assistance from the wrong
worker were sent away without explanation, thinking mistakenly that they
were entitled to nothing.
Simon makes these observations in support of more discretion, and more
worker power exercised in a professional manner in the interests of the
clients. We do not necessarily share that opinion. What he has illustrated,
however, is that thoughtless, despotic and irresponsible worker conduct is
just as possible under a rule based system as not, and further that rules
themselves may be used as an instrument of worker tyranny. To the extent
that this is a problem in Ontario, the solution lies elsewhere than in the facile
attempt to curb worker discretion.
Much the same can be concluded about the political dimension to the power
analysis. Public discretionary powers have been analyzed at the macro level
and criticized as vehicles whereby the state increases its own power and
correspondingly lessens the power and autonomy of its citizens. 14 However
valid this criticism may be, little of significance turns on whether particular
provisions in legislation employ discretionary or rule-based entitlement
language. The source of the state power over the individual rests far more in
its having something to distribute to citizens (social assistance), than on the
terms for distribution (discretion or rule). 15 The degree to which a citizen can
control the state through legal rules and judicial institutions is distinctly
limited in the first place, and depends little on the rule-discretion choice in
14. See for example, C. Smith and D.C. Hoath, Law and the Underprivileged (London;
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); Wilding, Professional Power and Social
Welfare (London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); and Galligan, Discre-
tionary Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Manitoba Task Force Report,
1983, at 28; Reich, supra note 13.
15. For the view that discretion causes client degradation, see Burman and Gardner,
"The Negotiation Of Trust And Identities In The Public Distribution System" (Con-
ference on Qualitative Analysis, York University, 1990) [unpublished] at 34.
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the second. Modem attempts to empower citizens and clients are based on
giving them meaningful participation in both institutional design and opera-
tion. 16 Although we shall not consider the power critique directly again, much
of what follows will support the conclusions we have reached here.
3. THE LIMITS OF RULES: THE LAW OF
CONSERVATION OF DISCRETION
Given the citizen entitlement model, and assuming that the characterization
of discretionary decision-making as arbitrary decision-making is warranted,
the important question which remains is whether there is any room whatso-
ever for discretionary decision-making in social assistance legislation. That
is, is it possible, and if so desirable, to draft legislation which consists solely
of precise legal rules? The short answer to both questions is no.
3.1 OPEN TEXTURE AND ITS CONTROL: THE
STANDARD SUGGESTIONS
The analytic distinction between discretion and precise rules breaks down in
practice. Any system that requires the exercise of human judgment must have
an element of discretion. H.L.A. Hart put it this way: 17
Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication
of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great
mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in ques-
tion, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open tex-
ture.... (U)ncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of
general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters
of fact. Natural languages like English are when so used irreducibly open
textured.
To the extent that open texture is a problem, little may be done about it. One
possibility is to avoid general classifying terms. It is also unrealistic to expect
the legislature to be willing and able to anticipate all specific criteria and to
keep them current in the legislation. Davis recognized as naive the hope that
administrative discretion could or should be replaced by more precise legis-
lative drafting. Instead, he encouraged agencies to use their internal rule-
making power to publish more specific guidelines as they developed with
experience. 18 The extensive policy manuals employed within Ontario's
16. See for example, Handler, "Continuing Relationships And The Administrative Pro-
cess: Social Welfare" [1985] Wise. L.R. 687; Mosher, "Recipient Participation in
Discretionary Decision-Making" (University of Toronto, 1989) [unpublished] at 2.
17. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 124-5.
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social assistance scheme would appear to be precisely what Davis called for.
However, as we shall demonstrate below, the generation of more precise rules
in manuals does not solve the problem. Moreover, the policy manuals in
existence in Ontario pose specific problems of their own..
This, then, is the standard recipe for controlling discretion. First, for each
statutory power of decision define the standard case with a rule, not a
discretionary power. Second, refine the legislative language to move from
general classifying terms to more specific language. Third, continue the task
of further precision in rule drafting in co-operation with the agency itself. By
this route, discretion in both clear and borderline cases can be virtually
eliminated.
3.2 MORE RULES GENERATE MORE DISCRETION
Unfortunately, the standard recipe does not turn out too well. Even if one
could anticipate all contingencies, there is another sense in which it is
impossible to eliminate discretion by increasing the number of precise legal
rules. Imagine one could isolate all the decisions that a person in a particular
job classification in the social assistance field would be required to make.
Imagine that one was able to list every factor that might be relevant to the
decision, define it unambiguously, and assign to it a direction and weight in
the decision-making process. Imagine the size of the statute and policy
manual that would result from 'this exercise. The more one generates rules
and generates more precise rules, the more likely they become so numerous,
complex, and conflicting that no worker could be reasonably expected to
learn them, let alone to follow them. 19 There is nothing unusual about this.
In any large organization the number and complexity of the rules exceeds the
workers' ability to comply with them. This is what "work-to-rule" is all
about.20
18. Supra, note 4 at 55. For a sophisticated critique of Davis' work, see Baldwin and
Hawkins, "Discretionary Justice: Davis Reconsidered" [1984] Public Law 570.
19. We may have reached this point in Ontario. See Back on Track (1991), at 25. See
also Kerr v. Central Manager, Dept. of Soc. Services of Metro. Toronto (1991), 4
O.R. (3d) 430, 82 D.L.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. Div. Ct.), in which the regulations under
the General Welfare Assistance Act are described as "Kafkaesque". For a comment
on the complexity of the British system see Brown, "The British Social Security Tri-
bunals: A New Unified System for Adjudication of Social Security Benefits" (1986)
17 Camb. L.R. 40 at 52.
20. See generally J.M. Prottas, People-Processing (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
1979), especially at 166-168; Simon, supra, note 11 at 1228 and at 1198.
Discretion in Social Assistance Legislation
So we must confront a basic and important paradox. The more one attempts
to control discretion with rules, the more one increases the defacto discretion
that workers will actually exercise. In the face of this rule overload, the
worker will have to develop his or her own routines in order to cope. This is
an illustration of what Simon has described as the "law of conservation of
discretion".21 In complex systems such as the public assistance system in
Ontario, one can limit the lawful exercise of discretion only by expanding
the illicit exercise of discretion. The moral authority of the entire ministry
will be undermined to the extent official standards are ignored in favour of
defacto employee codes. There is no reason to expect that the defacto code
will bear any relationship to the legislative goals, even if the workers are
aware of what these goals are. More likely, the de facto code will evolve to
cope with the time pressures created by the excessive number of rules, and
to satisfy the interests of the individual workers, however commendable or
reprehensible they may be.
3.4 DISCRETION BEST LIMITED BY SIMPLIFICATION
Given that a certain amount of discretion is inevitable, the most effective
means of limiting it is to simplify the legislative scheme, and the bureaucratic
procedures necessary to implement it. Discretion comes from the process of
decision-making. The fewer the number of decisions required, the less the
impact of discretion. The fewer the number of decisions required, the easier
to monitor and enforce ministry standards. Prottas puts it this way:22
... street level discretion increases as the number and complexity of client
categories increases.... The more distinctions it is asked to draw among cli-
ents the less control its leadership retains over how those distinctions are
actually operationalized.
4. The Legal Limits to Administrative Discretion
At law there is no such thing as unlimited discretion. All discretionary
powers, no matter how broad the statutory language, are subject to numerous
legal limits and constraints. No administrative power authorizes capricious
decisions or decisions based on the personal motives of the worker. Various
legal remedies, notably judicial review, exist to deal with complaints of this
type. Any criticism of broad discretionary language which assumes otherwise
is simply misconceived. Indeed, there is far less difference than supposed in
21. Supra, note 13 at 1224.
22. Supra, note 20 at 166.
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the degree to which rules, structured powers and general powers are limited
by law.
4.1 DWORKIN'S STRONG AND WEAK DISCRETION
Dworkin has drawn an apparent distinction between two types of lawful
discretion, "weak" and "strong" discretion. 23 To say a decision-maker has
strong discretion means that the decision-maker is authorized to choose
among alternative courses of action for whatever reason he or she might wish.
Put otherwise, there are no binding standards imposed by law against which
the decision may be evaluated. With weak discretion there exist binding
standards imposed by a superior to govern a subordinate in his or her exercise
of a decision-making power. However, because the standards cannot be
applied mechanically, the decision-maker must exercise interpretation or
judgment to apply the standards.
To illustrate the difference between strong and weak discretion, Dworkin uses
the example of a sergeant ordered by a superior officer to select soldiers for
patrol. The sergeant has strong discretion to chose if ordered to select any
five soldiers. In contrast, if ordered to select the five most experienced
soldiers, the sergeant would have weak discretion.
The key distinction for Dworkin is that in the first case, one cannot criticize
the sergeant for having made a wrong choice, wrong to be determined by
formal criteria in the order. One can criticize the decision on other grounds.
The decision might be a poor one if the five least capable soldiers were
selected for an important mission, or an unfair one if the same five soldiers
were always chosen for unpleasant tasks, or malicious if the five were chosen
to satisfy a private grudge. With weak discretion, in addition to these
criticisms, the decision may be criticized as wrong if the soldiers chosen do
not somehow meet the criterion of "most experienced".
However, it is not quite true to say that an exercise of strong discretion cannot
be criticized as wrong. "Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist
except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is therefore
a relative concept" 24. No administrator has, or could have, lawful discretion
to decide free of all constraints.
23. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) at 31-33. He also
identified a third type, "final discretion" which we discuss briefly in section 5,
below.
24. Ibid at 31.
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4.2 LEGAL CONTROL FROM BEYOND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME
Every discretionary power, strong or weak, is subject to formal legal con-
straints which exist independently of the administrative regime. For example,
public decision-makers are constrained by the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, and by the Human Rights Code of Ontario. No administrative
decisions that violate such constraints are final as a matter of law, because
they may be challenged in the courts. Of course, as a practical matter, few
recipients of social assistance are likely to mount such a legal challenge, a
matter to which we shall return shortly.
4.3 LEGAL CONTROL EXPRESSED IN THE LEGISLATION
Second, the description of even the strongest discretionary power usually
defines its own outer limits. Dworkin's example of the sergeant's strong
discretion illustrates this. There may be strong discretion to choose any
soldier, but the range of discretionary choice is limited to soldiers. Each
important discretionary power in the social assistance legislation will be, or
should be, limited in this sense.
4.4 LEGAL CONTROL THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
IMPLIED JURISDICTIONAL ERROR
Third, within the limits of discretion there exist internal constraints. It is often
believed that this is true only of weak discretion, and believed that strong
discretion is subject to no internal constraints. For this reason, weak discre-
tion is favoured by reformers who regard discretion as a necessary evil in
social assistance legislation. If one cannot eliminate discretion entirely, at
least one can structure it internally with legislative standards. The famous
work of Davis is the classic example of this approach. 25 However, it-is false
to believe that strong discretion is subject to no internal constraints. On closer
examination, the distinction between strong and weak discretion turns out to
be little more than that between two points on a continuum in our project.
Limited discretionary powers are conferred by legislation to statutory public
authorities who administer the social assistance schemes. Administrative
discretion, whether strong or weak, must be exercised within these limits, or
within "jurisdiction". Some jurisdictional limits are obvious. For example,
25. See Davis, supra, note 4 at 102. He distinguished between limiting and structuring
discretion as follows: " ... rules which establish limits on discretionary power con-
fine it, and rules which specify what the administrator is to do within the limits
structure the discretionary power."
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an Ontario social assistance worker lacks jurisdiction to deny benefits under
British Columbia legislation, or to revoke an Ontario driver's licence. Others,
as discussed below, are far more subtle.
Judicial review is the standard legal remedy for jurisdictional error. In theory,
judicial review is quite different from a right of appeal. For our purposes, a
successful application for judicial review means that although a reviewing
court cannot replace an administrative decision with a decision of its own, it
may declare an exercise of administrative power void if the decision is made
without "jurisdiction". An appellate body reviews legal errors, and may
substitute its own view of the "correct" decision for that of the decision under
appeal. Such a right would be incoherent in the case of strong discretion
where, by definition, there are no standards upon which to judge the decision
as legally correct.
The difference between judicial review and an appeal is relevant to the
distinction Dworkin attempts to draw between weak and strong discretion.
He suggests that strong discretion may be criticized on many grounds (e.g.
poor, malicious, unfair, irrational, biased), but not challenged as wrong in
law. If we understand him to mean that an appeal from an exercise of strong
discretion would be incoherent, he is correct. But, that is not the whole story.
In fact, every one of Dworkin's grounds of criticism and more are routinely
relied upon in Ontario Courts to support judicial review.
Even in the absence of a statutory right of appeal, excesses of jurisdiction
may be challenged in an application for judicial review. In addition to
jurisdictional limits which are explicit in the legislation, the courts have
recognized implied jurisdictional limits to the even the broadest statutory
description of administrative discretion. Discretionary decisions must be
based on "considerations pertinent to the object of the administration. '' 26
Thus, as a matter of law, no administrator in the social assistance field could
rely on strong discretionary language to claim the right to make a capricious
decision. The courts will read such a strong discretionary power as bounded
by the object of the scheme. Moreover, in practice judicial review has
developed to the point that any error may be characterized as "jurisdictional"
by a court determined to review. As noted above, all of the types of criticism
mentioned by Dworkin (poor, malicious, unfair, irrational, biased) may form
26. Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, per Rand J. Note this is another example
of the law of conservation of discretion discussed in Section 4. Judicial review shifts
discretion to determine relevance from the agency to the courts. It does not eliminate
discretion.
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the basis of a jurisdictional attack in an action for judicial review. 27 It is also
worth noting that judicial review effectively transfers discretion from bureau-
crats to the courts to determine whether, for example, a particular decision is
rational or not.
In summary, statutory discretionary powers do not, as a matter of law,
authorize arbitrary (capricious, random, whimsical, irrational, malicious,
unfair, corrupt) decision-making. Judicial review is available to challenge the
exercise of any statutory power of decision on virtually any ground, including
these. In this respect, there is little significant difference between strong and
weak discretion.
5. DE FACTO DISCRETION: BEYOND THE LAW
In the previous section we attempted to demonstrate that the legal limits to
discretionary powers are not dissimilar to the limits imposed by more
precisely worded rules. In fact, a great deal of employee behaviour is not
governed by formal legal limits at all, be these explicit limits in rules or
implied limits to discretionary powers. The practical question is whether
rules or discretionary powers are more easily enforced to secure compliance
with legislative goals.
5.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNWRITTEN RULES
Organizational theorists do study the formal structures of an organization
such as a social assistance ministry or department, the legislation, regula-
tions, and policy handbooks. But these formal structures, the pre-occupation
of lawyers, are relatively unimportant for social scientists. Numerous studies
of public bureaucracies suggest that bureaucrats deviate frequently from legal
rules. Moreover, they seem to do so quite deliberately, not as a matter of
error.28. Instead, it is hypothesized, they tend to follow unwritten codes of
conduct, codes which are likely reflect the interests of the bureaucracy itself
27. The formal law of judicial review is predicated on a distinction between a question
of jurisdiction (to which the administrator may not have the final say) and a question
of the merits (to which, in the absence of a right of appeal, the administrator does
have the final say). The practice of judicial review is predicated on collapsing the
distinction between jurisdiction and merits to allow judicial review whenever the
courts feel judicial supervision is warranted. Perhaps the explanation of jurisdic-
tional error that best supports this analysis may be found in the famous quote of
Lord Reid in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C.
147 at 171.
28. Here we would disagree with Beatty, supra, note 3 at 6, who speaks of simple
worker error.
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and the interests of the individual bureaucrats, rather than the legislative
interest reflected in the statute.
Any person who has ever worked in any organization knows this to be true.
To succeed in any employment setting requires one to internalize the sub-cul-
ture of the work environment. One learns quickly which formal rules one is
expected to observe, and which may be forgotten, if indeed they are ever
learned. One learns the expectations of one's co-workers and superiors, the
rewards for compliance and the penalties for deviance. And little or none of
this ever appears in the statute, regulation, or even in the employee handbook.
Actual behaviour in bureaucracies is determined by a mixture of formal and
informal rules, some lawful and some not. This is not an indictment of the
public service, or even a mild criticism. It is simply an observation about
what is and what must be. What it signifies for this project is that any attempt
to limit or structure discretionary decision-making by careful drafting of
social assistance legislation will be insufficient, perhaps futile, unless that
effort is coordinated with efforts to control de facto discretionary powers. It
also suggests that the preference for precision over general discretion should
be based, in part, on whether one is more easily monitored and enforced than
the other.
5.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DE FACTO DISCRETION,
LAWFUL DISCRETION, AND RULES
It is tempting, and in keeping with legal tradition, to put this aside entirely
as a matter of monitoring and enforcement, rather than as a matter of
discretion. Note, however, that from the practical perspective of the client
who perceives that he or she is being treated in an arbitrary (capricious or
inappropriate) manner the distinction is less important. In terms of what the
client experiences, it matters little what is the source of the "discretionary"
power. The power may be statutory and lawful. It may result from the
system's inability to police itself effectively. It may result from systemic rule
and task overload. It makes little practical sense to distinguish between these
for the purpose of client problem definition. 29
It is entirely beyond the scope of this project to offer a comprehensive
analysis of de facto discretionary powers in Ontario's social assistance
scheme. Any proper approach to that topic would require agency-specific
empirical study. We can, however, make a few observations about de facto
29. See also Back on Track, at 100.
Discretion in Social Assistance Legislation
discretion, concentrating on the relationship between defacto discretion and
de jure discretion granted by the legislation.
Earlier, we argued that there is no such thing as the lawful. authorization of
capricious decision-making power. We can now dispose of the allegation of
capricious decision-making in the practical realm. The exercise of de facto
discretion is virtually always governed by a complicated set of unofficial
rules or norms. The problem is not the absence of rules, but rather one of
determining which of the formal and informal rules are operative, and then
determining how to control them.
A comprehensive strategy for controlling administrative discretion must be
directed towards promoting congruence between workers' personal values
and interests and the policy goals of the public social assistance scheme.
Recruitment and training may prove far more influential than drafting,
monitoring and enforcing rules and standards.30 The problem with rules, even
if they could be drafted to insure perfect results, is that employees do not
always follow them. And, it seems reasonable to suppose that exactly the
same factors that skew the exercise of statutory discretion will influence
outcomes when employees do not follow the statutory rules. So, whether we
are dealing with rules or discretionary powers, there must exist some mech-
anism for compliance review and some incentive to use it.31
30. See Simon, supra, note 13, who argues throughout for less formal structure and for
a better trained and motivated work force. See also Beatty, supra, note 3 at 47. For a
criticism of the notion that rules shape the world and suggestions for more effective
rule-making, see Baldwin, "Why Rules Don't Work" (1990) 53 Mod. L.R. 321.
31. No area in an administrative regime tends to be more dominated by discretionary
powers than policing and enforcement. Frequently, the legislation is silent on the
very question of whether there will be any institutional monitoring or enforcement
of legislative standards, let alone on the questions of whether and which standards
will be enforced, against who, and with what sanctions. We raise for consideration
the possibility that more rule-governed monitoring and enforcement might be a very
effective check on employee behaviour, including an effective review of discretion-
ary powers. For example, it has been suggested that an agency itself ought to initiatejudicial review in a given number of randomly selected cases. See Simon, supra,
note 13. This proposal also responds to some of the other barriers to enforcement at
the initiative of clients discussed below. We also note that the monitoring scheme
chosen can itself distort the decision-making process. For example, if "good" deci-
sion-making is measured by the absence of client complaints, one would expect few
client requests for aid to be turned down. If measured by budget reduction from the
previous period, one may expect considerably more client dissatisfaction. These are
matters beyond the scope of this project, but too closely connected to be ignored
completely.
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5.3 RULES AND MODEST CONTROL OF DE FACTO
DISCRETION
There are a number of reasons to suggest that rules may be somewhat easier
to monitor and enforce than are discretionary powers. To the extent that
employees try to comply with the legislative intent, rules, in the standard case
at least, dictate the correct outcome. This should reduce error at the first level
of decision. It is difficult to monitor compliance with legislative purpose
without some statement of purpose against which to measure behaviour.
Rules provide relatively clear information to clients about their entitlements
under the legislation. This, we might predict, will increase the clients' ability
to monitor and enforce on their own initiative. Finally, whenever decisions
are reviewed by superiors, appellate bodies or courts, those bodies also have
a great deal of defacto and dejure discretion. Again, we might expect a clear
rule to control outcomes better than general discretionary powers at that
level. 32
These apparent advantages should not be overstated. Good faith error is
seldom the main cause of employee deviance. One or two clear rules may
assist clients to know their rights. Numerous complicated rules emanating
from a variety of sources do not. There are many barriers to client-initiated
enforcement other than uncertainty about entitlement. Some are obvious.
How many social assistance clients can afford a court challenge? Some are
more subtle. Many clients will prefer to take less than they might secure after
review than to expose themselves, their privacy and dignity to further
scrutiny.33 And, the relationship between a social assistance agency and the
client, even when brief, tends to be an ongoing one. The sociological litera-
ture makes clear that legal action is not a common or desired form of dispute
resolution among persons who are in a continuous relationship, as opposed
to persons who experience a chance-encounter discrete dispute. 34
32. This is the position taken by Ginsburg, "Discretionary Power In The General Wel-
fare Assistance Act Of Ontario" (1987) 2 J. Law and Social Policy 1 at 21. We are
more sceptical about judicial review as a meaningful form of administrative control
in the social assistance context. In contrast to Ginsburg, see Norton, supra, note 1 at
1296-7.
33. See Handler, "Legality Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System" (1983) 92
Yale L.J. 1198 at 1279;
34. The foundation work in this area is Macaulay,"Non-Contractual relations in Busi-
ness: A Preliminary Study" (1963) 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55. See also Handler, supra,
note 33. All of this is a to ic in its own right. For present purposes, we wish only to
emphasize that the existence of a rule-defined right and its enforcement by client
action are two very differ at matters.
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On balance, we would conclude that rules have a small, but useful, advantage
over discretionary powers from a monitoring and enforcement perspective.
As we have demonstrated throughout, it is neither possible nor desirable to
replace all, or even most, discretionary powers with precise rules. It remains,
however, feasible to attempt to capture some of the enforcement advantages
of rules by making the limits of discretion as explicit as possible, and by
structuring important discretionary powers by stating explicitly the legisla-
tive purpose behind the power. We offer a number of reasons for a move in
this direction below.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Legal rules purport to determine precisely what is to be done in a given
situation. Discretionary powers authorize the decision-maker to exercise
judgment. In fact, the application of rules to particular cases always requires
some element of discretion. The exercise of discretion is always bounded by
legal rules. It is inevitable that any legislative social assistance scheme will,
in practice if not in form, operate through a mixture of rules and discretionary
powers. Even were it desirable, and we are not of that opinion, it would be
impossible to eliminate discretionary decision-making from Ontario's social
assistance scheme.
It transpires that many problems attributed to legislative grants of discretion-
ary power have other causes. They can and do exist under rule dominated
systems. For example, capricious or inappropriate or autocratic decision-
making is just as likely in the application of a rule as in the exercise of a
discretionary tower. De facto discretion will have as much or more of an
objectionable impact on clients as lawful discretion. It follows that efficient
monitoring and enforcement of agency conduct is far more likely to generate
compliance with legislative objectives than is the choice between rules and
discretionary powers of decision.
If this paper were to make one important contribution to legal reform in the
social assistance field it should be this: a great deal more attention ought to
be paid to setting goals and establishing a scheme for monitoring and
enforcing them than to establishing unenforced and perhaps unenforceable
client rights.
There are at least two things directly relevant to this project that may
influence the ability to monitor and enforce the legislative purposes under-
lying the social assistance legislation. First, as precise rules proliferate and
become more complex employees tend by necessity to ignore them and
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policing becomes relatively more difficult. The simpler the legislative
scheme, the more likely it will be achieved. Second, monitoring and enforce-
ment of discretionary powers is more effective the more structured they are.
In particular, without a statement of the purpose for which the power was
granted, how can anyone monitor meaningfully the exercise of the power?
7 RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we attempt to devise general recommendations which we will
later apply more particularly to the different type of decisions made pursuant
to social assistance legislation.
Firstly, it is absolutely essential that rules be devised to govern the great
majority of important decisions in the social assistance scheme. Even if one
favoured a totally discretionary system, which we do not, this would prove
prohibitively time consuming and expensive. 35 Workers .would quickly
develop de facto rules to enable them to cope. It is far better to have the
legislature develop efficient rules to govern the relatively uncontroversial
paradigmatic case.
We would characterize Ontario as a jurisdiction where its government and
citizens adopt the client entitlement model of social assistance. Therefore,
there is an important symbolic advantage to a scheme that purports to govern
most major decisions by legal rule.
Precise rules, when they are followed, eliminate the exercise of human
judgment in particular cases.. Precise rules should be favoured when the
desired outcome can be predicted with relative certainty, i.e. when there is
relatively little need for human judgment. They should also be favoured when
the consequences of inappropriate discretionary decisions are particularly
high.
Rules, provided they are relatively few and simple, may be marginally better
at securing worker compliance with legislative objectives than discretionary
powers.
Finally, some clients may prefer to be dealt with as a paradigm case, in a rote
disengaged manner, than to become more intimately involved with the system
and workers in an effort to secure greater assistance. A rule that provides
routinely basic assistance leaves clients with the choice of whether to move
35. See Beatty, supra, note 3 at 38 for a discussion of cost-effective use of discretionary
powers.
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from a perceived position of claimant of right to one of supplicant seeking
additional discretionary relief.
We emphasize again that we are recommending relatively few rules, and
relatively simple rules. Discretion cannot be eliminated under any scheme
that requires choice, but it can be reduced by reducing the need for choice.
Thus, for example, the fewer the categories of applicant or criteria for
eligibility in social assistance legislation, the less room for administrative
discretion to operate. Simplicity in legislative design also makes it more
likely that the legislate purpose will be observed voluntarily, and makes it
easier to monitor and enforce worker compliance. The number of formal and
informal rules found in social assistance legislation, regulations, and hand-
books vastly exceeds the cognitive capacity of experts and employees, let
alone clients. This is a breeding ground for uncontrollable defacto discretion.
Now we must confront the other side of the coin. A relatively simple
rule-based scheme will be too crude. Rules are invariably over-inclusive or
under-inclusive. This is where statutory discretionary powers can help.
Essentially, discretion can operate in one of two directions or both. Discretion
can be granted to allow a worker to expand eligibility or quantum from what
it would be under the rule. And, discretion can be granted to disentitle
someone who would otherwise be eligible under the rule. At a minimum, the
legislature should specify how, in this sense, the discretion may operate.
It is difficult to argue in principle against allowing discretion to benefit
deserving clients, although concerns about arbitrary entitlement remain.
Discretion to disentitle may be more objectionable to clients and hence more
politically problematic, even though economists assure us there is no differ-
ence between experiencing a loss and foregoing a benefit. However, without
discretion to disentitle funds will be wasted on cases that fit the words, not
the purpose of the rule.
In our opinion, there is relatively little significant difference in law or practice
between grants of strong and weak discretion. Notwithstanding this analysis,
we do favour a move from strong discretionary language towards more
structured discretionary powers in social assistance legislation. We perhaps
differ from traditional arguments of this sort in that we have more modest
expectations about the difference this will make in practice. Nevertheless, we
support a move in this direction. For one thing, this insulates the legislature
directly from any charge that the grant of discretionary power was arbitrary.
This may have important symbolic advantages. For another, forcing the
legislature and its advisory bodies, as well as the agencies themselves, to
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reflect on appropriate internal constraints for discretionary powers has inher-
ent value. One assumes that explicit discretionary powers are legislated for
a particular purpose. For example, the purpose of discretionary power is often
to enable the decision-maker to make eligible for assistance someone whose
claim meets the purpose, but not the words, of the rule. It is entirely
appropriate that the legislature be encouraged to consider and then to specify
that purpose in the legislation. 36 Finally, as discussed earlier, it may be that
more structured powers are easier to monitor and enforce to ensure compli-
ance with legislative objectives. Nevertheless, there is a limit to how strictly
limited and structured discretionary powers can be and still retain the advan-
tages for which they were chosen over precise rules.37
36. As to the theme of openness in administration see generally Davis, supra, note 4 and
Back on Track (1991).
37. See P. Williams Alchemy ofRace and Rights (Cambridge, Mass.; London, England:
Harvard University Press, 1991) at 146-7, where Ms. Williams, a black law profes-
sor makes an interesting comparison between how she and a white male friend had
negotiated apartment leases in New York City. He handed over a $900.00 cash
deposit to strangers with no contract, exchange of keys, or receipt. She negotiated
with friends a detailed lease establishing her as the "ideal ann's length transactor".
Our analysis in this paper might suggest that she had attached too much importance
to legal rights, or to suggest that she was not the typical social assistance client.
However, it seems more likely that Williams has an appreciation of the significance
of formal rights to the relatively less powerful which, whether symbolic or practical,
ought not to be discounted by us.
